I was in the UAE when Iranian President Ahmadinejah spoke at Columbia, so I watched coverage of the event on Al Jazeera, and got to talk about Iran a lot with others in the UAE. The emirati I talked to-- mainly fairly religious young people-- were positive about Ahmadinejah. They respected his populist vibe (although I understand he is criticized by many in Iran for failing to fulfill domestic campaign promises and instead focusing on the United States) and pointed out how his relatively austere, restrained lifestyle was in keeping with his politics.
A criticism of their own government may have been implicit in their remarks, or maybe I just heard what I wanted. In either case, there is a major difference in the governing structure of a state that has flawed elections in which case people elect a leader who tells them they deserve more as citizens and a state in which the non-elected royalty reward their population with non-obligatory largesse as they see fit.
I have to take political opinions in the UAE with a grain of salt because there is so much censorship and propaganda. In general, I'm finding it hard to get information I trust about Iran. I'm confident Ahmadinejah has made choices I would consider reprehensible. However, he has support for a reason, and I think it's important for the US to move beyond demonizing him to examine whether he is popular because of his criticism of America, or because of his efforts to combat inequality.
In a way, the way I feel about China is similar to the way I feel about Iran. Understanding both better is crucial to shaping our policy, but I can't get a handle on how much we should worry-- and in what ways. In Japan, there seems to be a lot of below-the-surface fear about China, but I haven't gotten to really discuss it with Japanese people yet.
I'd read about China's military and economic rise, and the arguments critiquing its strength, and at first to me it read a little like a play for attention by old school political scientists who hadn't been able to escape the Cold War mindset. It reminded me of John Mearshiemer's argument that Germany would rise again and rue the day! There were also concerns that Japan was going to eat us alive during the tail end of its financial boom.
Then I went to Dar es Salaam. Almost every businessman I saw in Tanzania was Chinese. Every single major construction project was built by a Chinese company. Brand new roads stretched across Northern Tanzania, courtesy of China. Yes, the point of the roads was often to get ore from the Mwanza area to seaside ports faster, but people also used them to get their goods to market, go to secondary school and see distant relatives.
One of my traveling buddies was half Chinese and half Caucasian, and she fielded a lot of questions about whether she spoke Chinese and whether she had ever been to China. Rumor had it that wealthy Tanzanians wanted Chinese nannies for their children so that they would grow up speaking Chinese. Even in more rural parts of the country, people were fascinated by China. They saw it as the "developing country that could."
For most of the twentieth century, even when people disliked the policy of the American government, I think they liked or admired things about "Americanness." We were the land of plenty, of possibility, of dreams. We were internally conscious of this. There's a body of literature that claims the Supreme Court was heavily influenced by the way segregation lend itself to effective anti-American Soviet propaganda. I'm nervous to make this claim-- I sort of feel like anyone born after 1980 has to struggle to get a handle on the Cold War-- but I do believe we won the Cold War because of the strength of our system of government, not the strength of our military or economy. (That was a set up for an argument about hard power versus soft power, but I'm skeptical of the dichotomy and will save it for another ramble.)
This is the decade when the world is falling quite out of love with America. We can engage other countries more in diplomacy, overhaul economic policy in an effort to save the dollar or pull out of Iraq, but I think a shift in attitudes towards Americanness (rather than America or the American government) is alarming because you can't prescribe a solid fix for a shift in attitudes.
A large part of this shift is undoubtedly due to the Iraq War and our Middle East policies. There's a story told that leaders like Ahmadinejah dislike America because of its secularism, but I think this is usually a way to escape critically examining our policy decisions. Some of it may be due to the rise of alternate powers like the EU and China (gotta love the fairy tale potential of the developing country that could). I think it's plausible, though, that part of it is due to increasing inequality within the US. We look more and more like the land of inequality and less like the land of plenty.
I once read that while Communist states during the Cold War could profess to offer equality of outcome, the United States could promise more equality of opportunity. I imagine any story about racial profiling gets substantial global media playing time (it definitely did on Al Jazeera) and this pokes holes in the idea of the American dream. So does our ever increasing Gini index and the fact that the children of rich people tend to stay rich and vice versa.
Of course, there are many reasons to be concerned about inequality in America other than the fact that it may reduce our global capital, and there are many reasons we have less global capital besides domestic inequality. I just think the potential links is interesting.
Showing posts with label Meddling American. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Meddling American. Show all posts
Thursday, November 22, 2007
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Ends, Means, and Iraq
One of my favorite professors at Swarthmore just posted an interesting commentary on people who kind of sort of supported the Iraq war but now say they didn't. (Specificially, people like Ignatieff who made arguments to the effect of "good war, bad administration, bad plan"-- I think this is very different than saying "good cause, bad war...")
Burke argues that you can't build a liberal society through war and military occupation, and then examines the pyschological process through which the idea of doing just this has been so appealing. People look to strengthen the liberal secular modern state through military action even though that is antithetical to its liberal foundation.
I'm no utilitarian but I have a weakness for ends-justify-means style arguments. People often say that acting in an ends-justify-means paradime means that the means cheapen or ruin the ends. Other than the obvious (a mother shouting at her child to be quiet, bombing campaigns to stop violence), I've never been able to dig into this argument. It always seemed to boil down to afterschool special lessons "The cookie won't taste good if you lie to get it" or the undeniable and unavoidable "Winning World War II without killing anyone would have resulted in a much less bittersweet victory." I think this post made me appreciate how the wrong means can entirely invalidate the ends.
Burke's post is about the United States attempting to create liberal societies through military action, but it also made me think about the way a country could become iliberal through an effort to domestically impose liberalism or secularism. I struggle a lot with the relationship between church and state in the United States but I think ultimately our premise allows for more individual freedom (and also more room for error) than laicism as practiced by France and Turkey and most of Europe. Enforcing secularism through headscarf bans is decidedly iliberal.
Burke argues that you can't build a liberal society through war and military occupation, and then examines the pyschological process through which the idea of doing just this has been so appealing. People look to strengthen the liberal secular modern state through military action even though that is antithetical to its liberal foundation.
I'm no utilitarian but I have a weakness for ends-justify-means style arguments. People often say that acting in an ends-justify-means paradime means that the means cheapen or ruin the ends. Other than the obvious (a mother shouting at her child to be quiet, bombing campaigns to stop violence), I've never been able to dig into this argument. It always seemed to boil down to afterschool special lessons "The cookie won't taste good if you lie to get it" or the undeniable and unavoidable "Winning World War II without killing anyone would have resulted in a much less bittersweet victory." I think this post made me appreciate how the wrong means can entirely invalidate the ends.
Burke's post is about the United States attempting to create liberal societies through military action, but it also made me think about the way a country could become iliberal through an effort to domestically impose liberalism or secularism. I struggle a lot with the relationship between church and state in the United States but I think ultimately our premise allows for more individual freedom (and also more room for error) than laicism as practiced by France and Turkey and most of Europe. Enforcing secularism through headscarf bans is decidedly iliberal.
Thursday, November 8, 2007
Imagination (Part I)
I powered through our final proofs today, and re-read a lot of the transcripts about the US’s role in the world back in the late nineties and early 21st century. It was interesting how different the conversation was pre-9/11 or even pre-Iraq-invasion. One ‘rhyming chorus’ I did find was that people argued that the United States was involved in the 1998 Kosovo bombing campaign to establish strategic military control in the region.
One theme that jumped out to me in several pieces was world leaders—Clinton, Peres, and a few others—who all called for more imagination in shaping the future. I usually think of imagination as being the province of inventors, writers, and children, but I really think there’s something there. I know we can’t have better policy without better analysis and a deeper understanding of history. I buy that a critical mistake in the execution and the conception of the Iraq war was the lack of discussion of Iraq’s history. I spent a lot of college trying to learn modern world history and only got more aware of how little I understood. I also came to realize that “understanding” history could be misconstructed to create bad policy—the emphasis on age old tribalism in early journalism about Rwanda and Kaplan’s book, Balkan Ghosts—particularly when it makes the present seem inevitable rather than logical.
But as crucial as history is in understanding the world today, I’m starting to feel like imagination is what’s crucial in moving forward, and one big thing that’s missing. Whenever I hear American leaders talk about foreign policy, it’s in this very narrow frame of pull out/stay in Iraq, engage with Iran or North Korea or don’t engage, trade with Cuba or don’t, ignore Sudan or promise to act at some future date. Maybe it’s a lack of vision or a lack of knowledge, but I think it’s also a lack of imagination.
The Marshall Plan always strikes me as really radically imaginative foreign policy. I don’t know if it was in its time—maybe it just seemed inevitable then—but it was so different than the way that every other victor had ever treated every other loser in world history. Other nominees for imaginative policy: the creation of the UN, the Berlin airlift. I also think the idea of “smart sanctions” or “luxury sanctions” is innovative. My understanding is that when accompanied by a very narrowly targeted bombing campaign, they were fairly successful against Milosevic.
One theme that jumped out to me in several pieces was world leaders—Clinton, Peres, and a few others—who all called for more imagination in shaping the future. I usually think of imagination as being the province of inventors, writers, and children, but I really think there’s something there. I know we can’t have better policy without better analysis and a deeper understanding of history. I buy that a critical mistake in the execution and the conception of the Iraq war was the lack of discussion of Iraq’s history. I spent a lot of college trying to learn modern world history and only got more aware of how little I understood. I also came to realize that “understanding” history could be misconstructed to create bad policy—the emphasis on age old tribalism in early journalism about Rwanda and Kaplan’s book, Balkan Ghosts—particularly when it makes the present seem inevitable rather than logical.
But as crucial as history is in understanding the world today, I’m starting to feel like imagination is what’s crucial in moving forward, and one big thing that’s missing. Whenever I hear American leaders talk about foreign policy, it’s in this very narrow frame of pull out/stay in Iraq, engage with Iran or North Korea or don’t engage, trade with Cuba or don’t, ignore Sudan or promise to act at some future date. Maybe it’s a lack of vision or a lack of knowledge, but I think it’s also a lack of imagination.
The Marshall Plan always strikes me as really radically imaginative foreign policy. I don’t know if it was in its time—maybe it just seemed inevitable then—but it was so different than the way that every other victor had ever treated every other loser in world history. Other nominees for imaginative policy: the creation of the UN, the Berlin airlift. I also think the idea of “smart sanctions” or “luxury sanctions” is innovative. My understanding is that when accompanied by a very narrowly targeted bombing campaign, they were fairly successful against Milosevic.
And Democratization (Part II)
(Punctuation Pun: Democratizing our foreign policy, not democratization: our foreign policy.)
Another thing I’ve been thinking about is how elite-dominated foreign policy formation tends to be. In international politics, we addressed this a little bit. We talked about the “democracy defecit” and the EU (as well as other international institutions). While the EU has representatives from member countries who get to vote and debate, these representatives aren’t elected, which could serve to make people feel detached from the body or unable to exercise control over its policies. There’s also, of course, “democratic peace theory,” the idea that two democracies never go to war with each other. (You have to define democracy very carefully to make this work, and one of my friends pointed out in study group that a “communist peace theory” worked equally well.) One tenant of this theory is that democracies are less likely to go to war, period, because the leaders who send a country into an unpopular war will be held accountable.
Despite this, it seems like there’s not that much discussion of the fact that fewer and fewer people make foreign policy decisions. This is worsened now that the decision to go to war is the sole purview of the president and doesn’t go through Congress, but I think it’s very applicable to the non-headline-news decisions too. Although international service trips and cultural exchanges remain popular, ‘diplomacy” remains very much in the hands of the elite. I think one reason for this is that there are fewer organized constituencies for foreign policy than domestic policy. The ones that exist (the Israel lobby, forces for and against free trade) get more playing time because there isn’t a market place of ideas.
I’m trying to figure out why this is:
-We’re a big country and so we don’t need to care as much because the international sphere affects us less.
To some extent, this makes sense. It’s frustrating how a lot of people in other countries know more about American politics than most Americans know about the entire rest of the world, but it makes sense because American politics may ultimately have the potential to have a greater impact on their life than domestic politics in their home country. It also can explain the presence of a security-forced constituency—‘we’ll care when it affects us.’
-We’re a nation of immigrants, and thus we should be full of people who have opinions and ties to the rest of the world.
Maybe it’s just that recent immigrants have too hard a time gaining political power or just getting by. It could also be that people don’t want to look like they have contradicting loyalties.
-Compared to foreign media, our own is myopic.
This is sort of a chicken-egg problem.
-It’s hard and complicated and requires too much education.
To me, the best refutation of this is the degree of passion around issues like social security privatization or tax policy. I’ve taken a minor-sized bit of econ and I feel like I can still only grasp the corners of these issues, but people are able to understand enough and develop opinions that shape their vote.
One thing I wonder is whether most foreign policy constitutencies would always vote in self-interest, resulting often in increased isolationism, because money and time spent abroad means less money and time domestically. However, a broad cross-section of Americans don’t vote in favor of their self-interest as is. There’s the whole “What’s the Matter with Kansas” thing and then there are wealthy people who vote in favor of economic justice and equality. I don’t know how value-based constituencies get shaped but it seems possible.
I should probably organize rambles like this one better before I post them. I’m just used to talking about these little thoughts walking back from the dining hall with a friend, or in the hallway outside my room when procrastinating on a problem set.
Another thing I’ve been thinking about is how elite-dominated foreign policy formation tends to be. In international politics, we addressed this a little bit. We talked about the “democracy defecit” and the EU (as well as other international institutions). While the EU has representatives from member countries who get to vote and debate, these representatives aren’t elected, which could serve to make people feel detached from the body or unable to exercise control over its policies. There’s also, of course, “democratic peace theory,” the idea that two democracies never go to war with each other. (You have to define democracy very carefully to make this work, and one of my friends pointed out in study group that a “communist peace theory” worked equally well.) One tenant of this theory is that democracies are less likely to go to war, period, because the leaders who send a country into an unpopular war will be held accountable.
Despite this, it seems like there’s not that much discussion of the fact that fewer and fewer people make foreign policy decisions. This is worsened now that the decision to go to war is the sole purview of the president and doesn’t go through Congress, but I think it’s very applicable to the non-headline-news decisions too. Although international service trips and cultural exchanges remain popular, ‘diplomacy” remains very much in the hands of the elite. I think one reason for this is that there are fewer organized constituencies for foreign policy than domestic policy. The ones that exist (the Israel lobby, forces for and against free trade) get more playing time because there isn’t a market place of ideas.
I’m trying to figure out why this is:
-We’re a big country and so we don’t need to care as much because the international sphere affects us less.
To some extent, this makes sense. It’s frustrating how a lot of people in other countries know more about American politics than most Americans know about the entire rest of the world, but it makes sense because American politics may ultimately have the potential to have a greater impact on their life than domestic politics in their home country. It also can explain the presence of a security-forced constituency—‘we’ll care when it affects us.’
-We’re a nation of immigrants, and thus we should be full of people who have opinions and ties to the rest of the world.
Maybe it’s just that recent immigrants have too hard a time gaining political power or just getting by. It could also be that people don’t want to look like they have contradicting loyalties.
-Compared to foreign media, our own is myopic.
This is sort of a chicken-egg problem.
-It’s hard and complicated and requires too much education.
To me, the best refutation of this is the degree of passion around issues like social security privatization or tax policy. I’ve taken a minor-sized bit of econ and I feel like I can still only grasp the corners of these issues, but people are able to understand enough and develop opinions that shape their vote.
One thing I wonder is whether most foreign policy constitutencies would always vote in self-interest, resulting often in increased isolationism, because money and time spent abroad means less money and time domestically. However, a broad cross-section of Americans don’t vote in favor of their self-interest as is. There’s the whole “What’s the Matter with Kansas” thing and then there are wealthy people who vote in favor of economic justice and equality. I don’t know how value-based constituencies get shaped but it seems possible.
I should probably organize rambles like this one better before I post them. I’m just used to talking about these little thoughts walking back from the dining hall with a friend, or in the hallway outside my room when procrastinating on a problem set.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
No more horror stories
Today I came across an essay by Matthew Yglesias on advocating for future progressive foreign policy. His basic premise is that progressive ideas need to be presented in a progressive way, and that it's remarkable how few leading Democrats are willing to make statements like "'starting a war with Iran would be a strategic disaster for the United States,'...'Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt founded the UN because a strong UN is good for the US,' 'getting other countries to follow non-proliferation agreements is going to require us to follow them too,' or 'reviving the Arab-Israeli peace process would make it easier for us to find Muslim allies.'" (The actual essay is only about 4 paragraphs so it's a quick read.)
Here's the thing: Over the past three years, I've been guilty of, when backed into a corner, making arguments along the lines of: "It's important to pay attention to Africa because our experiences with terrorism in the 90s (see East Africa Embassy bombings) show that failed states, war, and extreme poverty create a power vacuum in which it's easier for terrorism to flourish. {see Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan]" I don't think this is total BS, but my belief that we need a comprehensive approach to foreign policy in the developing world isn't really based on concerns about short-term security threats. Tanzania may be poor, but it's certainly no power vacuum. There may be war in the DRC, but they aren't attending American flight schools.
Yglesias argues that people need to make the point that "good things can happen in foreign policy and will happen with smart leadership, it's not just a realm in which scary people try to do scary things and we try to stop them." My earlier argument does sound a little bit like "Look, not only the Middle East can be scary! Africa can be scary too! Love it!" Competitive horror stories should be reserved for Halloween and camping trips.
However, it's almost impossible to have a conversation about seemingly distant wars and inequities without someone asking "Why should we care?"
The response I want to give is the impassioned and emotional one, citing moral obligation, chilling statistic, and heart-breaking anecdote. At bottom, I think we should care because it's just plain wrong to turn our backs on suffering. This is the sort of answer that's hard to give without eliciting sneers from would-be hardened realists, though. On the other hand, in order for progressive arguments to gain traction, we have to drop "the assumption that liberal ideas won't fly politically and need to be kept hidden under layers of macho posturing, and, instead, actually try to build progressive messaging around progressive ideas."
Another tactic is the "because we are responsible" tactic. I think this is usually more polarizing than persuasive, and it also relies on heavy-handed use of the counterfactual. Has the CIA done great wrong in assisting dictators like Saddam Hussein or Mobutu? Yes. But I'm uncomfortable tracing all current problems in the DRC back to the moment of US interception.
I think there's a bigger, better argument I should be making about restructuring the world and non-locking regimes and chaos theory and soft power, but I'm too tired.
Happy Election Day, USA!
Here's the thing: Over the past three years, I've been guilty of, when backed into a corner, making arguments along the lines of: "It's important to pay attention to Africa because our experiences with terrorism in the 90s (see East Africa Embassy bombings) show that failed states, war, and extreme poverty create a power vacuum in which it's easier for terrorism to flourish. {see Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan]" I don't think this is total BS, but my belief that we need a comprehensive approach to foreign policy in the developing world isn't really based on concerns about short-term security threats. Tanzania may be poor, but it's certainly no power vacuum. There may be war in the DRC, but they aren't attending American flight schools.
Yglesias argues that people need to make the point that "good things can happen in foreign policy and will happen with smart leadership, it's not just a realm in which scary people try to do scary things and we try to stop them." My earlier argument does sound a little bit like "Look, not only the Middle East can be scary! Africa can be scary too! Love it!" Competitive horror stories should be reserved for Halloween and camping trips.
However, it's almost impossible to have a conversation about seemingly distant wars and inequities without someone asking "Why should we care?"
The response I want to give is the impassioned and emotional one, citing moral obligation, chilling statistic, and heart-breaking anecdote. At bottom, I think we should care because it's just plain wrong to turn our backs on suffering. This is the sort of answer that's hard to give without eliciting sneers from would-be hardened realists, though. On the other hand, in order for progressive arguments to gain traction, we have to drop "the assumption that liberal ideas won't fly politically and need to be kept hidden under layers of macho posturing, and, instead, actually try to build progressive messaging around progressive ideas."
Another tactic is the "because we are responsible" tactic. I think this is usually more polarizing than persuasive, and it also relies on heavy-handed use of the counterfactual. Has the CIA done great wrong in assisting dictators like Saddam Hussein or Mobutu? Yes. But I'm uncomfortable tracing all current problems in the DRC back to the moment of US interception.
I think there's a bigger, better argument I should be making about restructuring the world and non-locking regimes and chaos theory and soft power, but I'm too tired.
Happy Election Day, USA!
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Culture and Development: three cheers for the all-ready wealthy
Robert J. Samuelson has a piece in the Washington Post today reviewing a new book by Gregory Clark, "A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World."
"Clark suggests that much of the world's remaining poverty is semi-permanent. Modern technology and management are widely available, but many societies can't take advantage because their values and social organization are antagonistic. Prescribing economically sensible policies (open markets, secure property rights, sound money)can't overcome this bedrock resistance....It's culture that nourishes productive behavior." Part of his thesis is that the Industrial Revolution accelerated the creation of the proper environment for capitalist growth because more successful men had more surviving children, who had learned attributes of success from their parents.
I have a strong negative knee-jerk reaction to pieces about the role 'culture' plays in economic development. So often, arguments about how cohesive families or forward-looking societies are necessary to fostering growth seem like a self-congratulatory excuse. The most pernicious forms of this argument are:
1) The lazy native argument (people in warm places don't work as hard because their lives are easier) mixed in with an abuse of Weber's Protestant work ethic (Protestantism places a value on hard work in and of itself that has been the key to Europe's success. The current state of the Irish economy compared to the rest of Europe pokes a major hole in this frame...)
2) The "loose families" argument used to explain the East Asian miracle. It goes something like: family structure is stronger in East Asia, therefore parents saved and invested money for their children's future and worked hard. In Africa, they have loose families so their economies suck AND they have AIDS. (I find this argument so upsetting I struggle to engage it productively. I do believe in looking at cultural variables, but this seems more like racism to me.)
To me, the central false premise is the idea that culture is immutable and behaviors are unchanging. This places culture on a glass-encased pedestal, one of my problems with cultural relativism too. Behaviors, especially economic decision-making, are as much the product of circumstance as anything else. I think family structure and 'morality' is a good way to look at this. In desperate times, poor women who can't feed their children sleep with men for money or food. It's an old story, and it was just as true during occupation and war in family-oriented East Asian tigers Korea and Japan as it is now in less-developed countries like Uganda.
I do believe a place can develop a "culture of corruption" that drives way investment, making economic growth nearly impossible. I have no clue how to lessen this, and I might be about to write myself into a chicken-and-egg trap. However, it seems to me that corruption is often a product of a lack of other opportunities or channels for entrepenerial activity. In both the UAE and Japan, it's very bad form to accept tips because it's considered a form of corruption. Decades ago, transaction gifts, whether cash or material, were common in both places. I think corruption inevitably lessens with broad-based development (an increase in opportunities, an increase in the educated population who can point out the corruption of officials) but this development won't take place without an increase in transparency. (Oh dear, I'm asking for the Big Push.)
Anyway, I think transparency comes from the strengthening of civil society and the birth of stronger institutions, not because successful parents passed on non-corrupt attitudes for generations. Lamarck is dead.
I don't have any big answers to the question the article begins with and tries to answer: Why are some countries rich and some countries poor? I do think US and EU agricultural subsidies remain a major obstacle to African growth. I do think unsuccessful Cold War policies set back many developing countries. However, it's also important to challenge the way local governments have attempted to take on poverty or lessen corruption and the (in)efficacy of international aid.
Before I went to Tanzania, I wrote an international economics paper on its prospects for growth. I was in love. I was wildly optimistic. It was, after all, a very stable democracy English-speaking democracy with a newly booming mineral and tourism sectors. The Gini index was low! Its neighbors had stopped fighting! Inflation was down and GDP was growing! Everyone should totally invest! My professor was a bit less Pollyannic. After spending a summer in Tanzania, I could better understand some of his skepticism. Corruption was endemic, and it was hard for even the bravest, most honest individuals to escape it because they were too desperate. However, I do believe that if we slashed agricultural subsidies, we'd be eating a lot more Tanzanian fruit-- and they'd be eating more, period.
I think there is some truth in the lead sentence in the article. Most of the world's remaining poverty probably is semi-permanent, due to shortage of resources if nothing else. However, blaming this inequity on intractible cultural variables is a convenient way to both get out of looking for solutions within our own society and a way to let developing-world leaders off the hook for corrupt practices. Don't mind Mobutu. It's just his culture.
"Clark suggests that much of the world's remaining poverty is semi-permanent. Modern technology and management are widely available, but many societies can't take advantage because their values and social organization are antagonistic. Prescribing economically sensible policies (open markets, secure property rights, sound money)can't overcome this bedrock resistance....It's culture that nourishes productive behavior." Part of his thesis is that the Industrial Revolution accelerated the creation of the proper environment for capitalist growth because more successful men had more surviving children, who had learned attributes of success from their parents.
I have a strong negative knee-jerk reaction to pieces about the role 'culture' plays in economic development. So often, arguments about how cohesive families or forward-looking societies are necessary to fostering growth seem like a self-congratulatory excuse. The most pernicious forms of this argument are:
1) The lazy native argument (people in warm places don't work as hard because their lives are easier) mixed in with an abuse of Weber's Protestant work ethic (Protestantism places a value on hard work in and of itself that has been the key to Europe's success. The current state of the Irish economy compared to the rest of Europe pokes a major hole in this frame...)
2) The "loose families" argument used to explain the East Asian miracle. It goes something like: family structure is stronger in East Asia, therefore parents saved and invested money for their children's future and worked hard. In Africa, they have loose families so their economies suck AND they have AIDS. (I find this argument so upsetting I struggle to engage it productively. I do believe in looking at cultural variables, but this seems more like racism to me.)
To me, the central false premise is the idea that culture is immutable and behaviors are unchanging. This places culture on a glass-encased pedestal, one of my problems with cultural relativism too. Behaviors, especially economic decision-making, are as much the product of circumstance as anything else. I think family structure and 'morality' is a good way to look at this. In desperate times, poor women who can't feed their children sleep with men for money or food. It's an old story, and it was just as true during occupation and war in family-oriented East Asian tigers Korea and Japan as it is now in less-developed countries like Uganda.
I do believe a place can develop a "culture of corruption" that drives way investment, making economic growth nearly impossible. I have no clue how to lessen this, and I might be about to write myself into a chicken-and-egg trap. However, it seems to me that corruption is often a product of a lack of other opportunities or channels for entrepenerial activity. In both the UAE and Japan, it's very bad form to accept tips because it's considered a form of corruption. Decades ago, transaction gifts, whether cash or material, were common in both places. I think corruption inevitably lessens with broad-based development (an increase in opportunities, an increase in the educated population who can point out the corruption of officials) but this development won't take place without an increase in transparency. (Oh dear, I'm asking for the Big Push.)
Anyway, I think transparency comes from the strengthening of civil society and the birth of stronger institutions, not because successful parents passed on non-corrupt attitudes for generations. Lamarck is dead.
I don't have any big answers to the question the article begins with and tries to answer: Why are some countries rich and some countries poor? I do think US and EU agricultural subsidies remain a major obstacle to African growth. I do think unsuccessful Cold War policies set back many developing countries. However, it's also important to challenge the way local governments have attempted to take on poverty or lessen corruption and the (in)efficacy of international aid.
Before I went to Tanzania, I wrote an international economics paper on its prospects for growth. I was in love. I was wildly optimistic. It was, after all, a very stable democracy English-speaking democracy with a newly booming mineral and tourism sectors. The Gini index was low! Its neighbors had stopped fighting! Inflation was down and GDP was growing! Everyone should totally invest! My professor was a bit less Pollyannic. After spending a summer in Tanzania, I could better understand some of his skepticism. Corruption was endemic, and it was hard for even the bravest, most honest individuals to escape it because they were too desperate. However, I do believe that if we slashed agricultural subsidies, we'd be eating a lot more Tanzanian fruit-- and they'd be eating more, period.
I think there is some truth in the lead sentence in the article. Most of the world's remaining poverty probably is semi-permanent, due to shortage of resources if nothing else. However, blaming this inequity on intractible cultural variables is a convenient way to both get out of looking for solutions within our own society and a way to let developing-world leaders off the hook for corrupt practices. Don't mind Mobutu. It's just his culture.
Sunday, October 28, 2007
The Turkish draft
I've been thinking a little bit about the tenor of the Turkish response to the PKK attack on Turkish soldiers. A Turkish friend, Z, was explaining the situation: Turkey will respond "through patience and diplomacy! The fight against terror is a long one. But watching news of young soldiers killed by PKK terrorists infiltrating into Turkey from the north of Iraq hurts too much. They were only 20 or 21 years old. Some were newly married, some had new born babies. Pft that's not fair!"
There's something about this response that just strikes me as different than our response when American soldiers are killed. It's certainly not the sorrow or the anger. I think maybe it's the sense of unfairness. It almost reminds me of American responses to 9/11-- only smaller scale and without the shock.
Turkey has a draft. All I have is an anecdote for evidence, but I wonder if universal service blurs the military-civilian distinction in the minds of the people.
There's something about this response that just strikes me as different than our response when American soldiers are killed. It's certainly not the sorrow or the anger. I think maybe it's the sense of unfairness. It almost reminds me of American responses to 9/11-- only smaller scale and without the shock.
Turkey has a draft. All I have is an anecdote for evidence, but I wonder if universal service blurs the military-civilian distinction in the minds of the people.
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